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This paper is about the development of suburbs in Kashmir over the 
past quarter century. The former polarity between city and hinterland is 
becoming blurred in these suburbs, both physically and culturally. This 
paper is divided into two parts. The first gives a macroscopic overview 
of how the concepts and contours of community are being re-imagined 
in these suburbs. Part Two provides glimpses of the same processes 
on a microcosmic scale, presenting the ongoing socio-economic and 
cultural changes as organic processes. The intention is that this micro-
view will, in combination with the macro-perspective presented in Part 
One, give a multi-dimensional impression of community-formation in 
suburban Kashmir.
Part One describes hitherto uncommon forms of exclusion in these 
suburbs, even to the extent of apparent social fragmentation. On the 
other hand, new patterns of inclusion are also becoming evident, some 
of them trans-local, virtual, even global in scale. Part Two presents a set 
of vignettes from my participant observations (Robben & Sluka 2012: 3) 
during fieldwork at a Kashmiri suburban wedding in the late summer of 
2011. Through my participant observations at rituals and preparations 
in the bride’s household, I present glimpses of emergent facets of 
inclusion and exclusion in relationships based on family, friendship, 
religion, gender and linguistic-ethnic community. 
1. Emergent Communities
In order to adequately understand contemporary developments in 
urbanism in Kashmir, it is worthwhile first to focus briefly on what the 
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term ‘city’ has traditionally meant in that particular context. The term 
has had a special resonance and meaning in common usage in Kashmir, 
which goes beyond the meaning of the generic term. For, ‘city’ has 
traditionally been used as a synonym for the city of Srinagar, the capital of 
Kashmir. Even today, one might come across people saying in Kashmiri: 
“mai chhu paga sitee gasun,” (“mai kal shehr jaoonga” in Urdu, or “I 
am going to the city tomorrow” in English). One is tempted to attribute 
this usage to a past in which the patterns of life were simple. But that 
sort of idealisation of the past might not stand close scrutiny. No doubt 
life and its patterns were always more or less complex, ambivalent 
and in flux. However, economists, sociologists, political scientists and 
historians of empires and colonies would perhaps recognise aspects of 
the polarity between centre and periphery in this contextual usage of 
the term ‘city’.1 In Kashmir, this polarity is a well documented facet of 
the economic (Hangloo 2000), social and political aspects of life through 
the past several centuries (Pandit 2006; Lawrence [1895] 2000). 
Let me clarify at this point what I mean when I use the term 
‘Kashmir’. The word is often used as shorthand for the state of Jammu 
and Kashmir, which came into being following the treaties of Lahore2 
and Amritsar3 in 1846. However, I use the term to describe the Valley of 
Kashmir, which is an identifiable geographical area – a fertile oval which 
is generally quite plain but is surrounded by high mountains. While the 
entire state is around the same size as Great Britain, which brought 
it into being, the Valley comprises only about five percent of the total 
area. However, the Valley contains about a third of the population of 
the state of Jammu and Kashmir. It has been a distinct political entity 
through much of history and has great geopolitical importance today. 
The bowl of the Valley, which is relatively densely populated, is about 
120 km long and about 40 km wide at many points. The linguistic-ethnic 
group which describes itself as Koshur or Kashmiri is concentrated in the 
bowl of this Valley. 
As I have already pointed out, the city of Srinagar has occupied 
a vital, central position in the life of the Kashmiri communities of the 
Valley. It is not only geographically at the centre, but also has remained 
economically and politically central through history (Pandit 2006).4 In 
times past, agriculture played a more important part, not only as a sector 
of economic production but, even more so, of employment. Through 
much of the period from the mid-18th to the mid-20th centuries5, land 
ownership was concentrated in the hands of landlords or of the state. 
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The substantial majority of these owners lived in Srinagar, or in the 
metropolitan centres of colonising powers beyond. Tillers and share-
croppers lived in the rural hinterland, often paying two-thirds and at 
times more of their crops to landlords and to the state. 
Another important source of employment, production and income 
was the embroidered Kashmiri shawl, and other handicrafts made of 
materials such as walnut wood, papier mache and copper. Here too, 
the city was the hub of wholesale, retail and factory work, although 
many rural households participated in these trades through cottage 
manufacture. During Dogra rule, residents of Kashmir’s hinterland had 
to pay a tax on goods which they wanted to bring into the city for sale. 
The tax was claimed at barriers on the roads through which one entered 
the city. It was payable even for wood that rural residents brought, 
often on their backs, to keep city dwellers warm during winter. People 
were often in terror of the tax collection authorities. This tax is only one 
indicator of the polarity between city and hinterland, which extended to 
the realms of politics, education and culture (Bazaz 1941).
The economic bases of the polarity between the city and the rural 
hinterland were severely undermined by the radical land reforms which 
took place from 1950.6 Another factor that contributed significantly 
to undermining the traditional city-periphery polarity was the pattern 
of government employment. From the 1920s onwards, government 
employment began to become the chief economic aspiration of many 
Kashmiri people, the very large majority of whom are Muslim (Bazaz 
1954). Efforts were made, more so from the 1950s onwards, to meet this 
aspiration: more and more persons from rural and hitherto impoverished 
families were employed in government jobs. A significant proportion of 
these were from rural areas (Devadas 2007: 91). Over the past half-
century, these employment trends have, in combination with the land 
reforms which continued until 1975, deeply unsettled the traditional 
polarity between the city and the peripheries. Education, healthcare, 
and roads and other modes of connectivity too became increasingly 
available in the hinterland.
This paper looks at the ways in which concepts of community are 
being re-imagined by the residents of these suburbs, as the traditional 
polarity between the city and the rural hinterland changes. I use the 
term community here in terms of the linkages that are organically being 
established between networks of association and support (Boissevain 
1974: 1). My focus is primarily geographical, regarding the new re-
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sidential areas surrounding the city of Srinagar and the other towns 
in the Valley that now qualify to be termed cities, i.e. Anantnag and 
Baramulla. I call the new settings in the outskirts of these cities suburbs. 
It is important to note that the residential spaces for which I use the 
term suburb in the context of Kashmir are comparable to the sorts of 
spaces that are described with the same word in places like Germany. 
These suburbs are not slums to which the rural poor migrate in search 
of work, as may be the case in some other settings. In Kashmir, building 
and moving to a residence in one of these areas is considered by most 
of those who do so as representing upward social mobility.
I categorise suburbanisation in Kashmir, specifically the city of 
Srinagar, into two phases. The first phase lasted from the 1930s until 
the 1960s, the second phase started in the 1980s and continues until 
today. The first phase took place in a far more planned manner than the 
second, mainly under the administrations of Maharaja Hari Singh and 
Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, who was the Prime Minister of the state on 
the Indian side of the Ceasefire Line7 from 1953 to 1963. Some of the 
suburbs which were developed in this first phase8 have a Londonesque 
layout and architectural style. Rows of houses in each particular suburb 
were built on the same architectural pattern. My work is on the second, 
continuing, phase of suburbanisation. It has been far more unplanned 
than the first phase. Processes of community formation in these new 
suburbs too are more organic and, sometimes, multi-faceted.
In this second phase, suburbs have been colonised in both directions 
– by families moving from the inner city as well as from the rural 
hinterland. Some have even moved from forest settlements at the 
edges of the Valley. The suburbs which I am focusing on are new.9 
They barely existed a quarter-century ago, at which time most of the 
land on which they now stand were fields or even marshland.10 They 
therefore represent a very contemporary trend. Looked at simply from 
the perspective of location, they represent a physical overlap between 
city and hinterland. These spaces thus are sites in which the traditional 
polarity between the city and the rural hinterland is blurring. More 
than just a physical overlap, however, these suburbs are sites for the 
evolution of new social milieus. Perhaps more importantly, even as they 
continue to evolve in the suburbs, these social milieus have already to 
some extent become normative patterns that are gradually spreading to 
other parts of the Kashmir Valley.
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1.1. New Modes of Socialisation
These new patterns represent a radical shift from the modes of 
socialisation that were common in both the inner city areas and in rural 
areas in the past. Strong bonds of local association were hallmarks 
of these earlier settings. Houses in both those locales tended to be 
open for visitors, who generally came unannounced. People spoke to 
each other from urban upper storey windows and from rural gardens, 
verandas and upstairs windows. In past centuries, the urban areas that 
today are often called Downtown Srinagar, Old Town Baramulla and the 
inner city of Anantnag had some identifiably typical features. Instead 
of the walls that surrounded many cities around the world11, Srinagar’s 
natural defences were formed by the river on two sides and a huge 
lake and mountains on the other two. Baramulla and Anantnag too 
had the river on one side and mountain slopes on the other.12 Within 
these natural boundaries lay dense urban sprawls of three to five storey 
buildings made of wood, stone and either adobe or brick. Although there 
were some exceptions to this pattern of urban construction (particularly 
among the upper crust), these buildings were typically built close to 
each other, with narrow lanes between them. Many of these buildings 
had enclosed balconies on the upper floors, which extended across part 
of the adjacent alley or road. From these, the children, women and 
other members of households could, and did, talk to their neighbours in 
adjacent buildings, or to people passing on the street below. 
Typically, houses in both urban and rural milieus were never locked. 
Neighbours and relatives walked in and out. Visitors were generally 
entertained in the kitchen, particularly in winter. Rural houses were 
even more open than urban ones. It was common enough for even 
distant relatives to arrive, having travelled long distances, without 
any forewarning. They would expect to stay, sometimes for indefinite 
periods. To drop in for a cup of tea or a game of cards has been common 
enough, even across socio-economic strata. In a society in which women 
and men often socialise separately, the sites of community life most 
often were the kitchen and the verandah. Sometimes, men were also 
received in a matted or carpeted, but otherwise unfurnished, room that 
often doubled as a (or the only) room for sleeping at night and for other 
activities by day.
The social milieus that have developed in the suburbs over the 
past couple of decades are radically different. Many of the houses in 
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these suburbs are large, with many rooms, and could be described as 
mansions. These houses often have a toilet on each floor; some have 
a separate toilet attached to each bedroom. However, the feature of 
Kashmir’s suburbs that is likely to strike a casual observer first is the 
walls around each individual property. Typically, each suburban house 
is surrounded by a two to three meter high wall, built around a garden 
or yard. The gates are almost as high as the walls and generally have 
a metal sheet over the slats or other features of the gate in order to 
prevent anyone from looking in.13 These gates are sometimes bolted 
from the inside. In such cases, a visitor must ring the bell from the road 
outside and, only if the gate is opened, may be admitted to even the 
garden. Walls are not only a noticeable motif of these suburbs, they may 
also be seen as a metaphor for the sort of social milieu, the lifestyle, 
the attitude to community, which is developing in these suburbs – and, 
by extension, in Kashmir. They seem to physically represent, indeed 
create, a very different societal reality from ones that used to exist in 
the areas from which most suburban residents have migrated. 
Many residents of such suburbs explain these walls and gates in 
terms of ‘security’. Without a doubt, there has been a critical need 
over much of the past quarter-century to secure one’s family against 
social and political disorder – various sorts of men with arms, street 
violence, and the increasing levels of crime that are noticeable in urban 
Kashmir.14 However, although the most common conscious reason for 
these high walls is security, it is worth exploring the anthropological and 
sociological processes that lie behind, around – even despite – these 
walls; processes which, at least to a casual observer, appear to cause 
social exclusion.
1.2. Exclusion
An obvious question that comes to mind is whether, and to what extent, 
these walls represent exclusion – an attempt to assert ownership of 
private space. For, they empower one with the agency to admit or not 
admit neighbours, relatives, family friends and work associates. In the 
particular context of Kashmir, a few questions come to mind. One is 
whether this evident insularity is a response to the violent, uncertain and 
dangerous environment in Kashmir. Further, could it denote rejection of 
an unresponsive and inefficient government? Could it also be a reflection 
FOCUS: INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION
117
of alienation from a government and system deemed to be illegitimate? 
If, indeed, the perceived illegitimacy of the system were a reason, 
an obvious paradox is evident: a substantial proportion of those who 
live in these suburbs are employed in government. Despite this fact, 
the walls around their houses are not the only indicators that they and 
their families have withdrawn from community in the form that it exists 
in the inner-city. Voting figures15 at polling booths indicate clearly that 
they are far less likely to vote than their rural compatriots, even though 
boycotts imposed under the threat of militant reprisals are generally 
far more potent threats in rural than in urban areas – and many senior 
government employees have armed security with them wherever they 
go, even at their homes.
As for the question regarding whether this withdrawal behind private 
walls may be associated with perceptions of government inefficiency 
and unresponsiveness, a couple of vignettes of suburban reality might 
give some insights. Even a casual visitor to these suburbs may be struck 
by the contrast between the opulence within many of the houses there 
and the squalor of some of the public spaces outside those walls. To 
begin with, the roads within these suburbs are narrow, sometimes 
unpaved or barely paved. For, while building boundary walls, residents 
often leave just enough space for two vehicles to squeeze past each 
other, and barely any space for pedestrians if two cars do pass each 
other. Generally, these suburbs have no municipal sewerage system. 
Houses are built over or beside an underground sump, from which 
sewerage is manually removed when it fills (ILO 2010). The other thing 
that is immediately noticeable is garbage. It generally gathers in heaps 
at unmarked spots along the road, which organically grow into refuse 
piles. So much so that a survey conducted under the auspices of India’s 
Union Ministry of Urban Development in 2010 listed Srinagar as the 
fourth dirtiest city in India.16 
This visible physical evidence indicates that these walls are only one 
aspect of a wider withdrawal from civic involvement. One could also ask 
whether the withdrawal of families behind these high walls represents 
social fragmentation. The framing of such questions, however, tends to 
reflect a negative perception of what these walls represent. It is also 
possible to point one’s inquiry in other directions. For example, could one 
not fruitfully ask whether these evolving suburban lifestyles represent a 
kind of modernity? The word modernity of course immediately opens an 
epistemological Pandora’s Box (Eisenstadt 2005: 3). To be sure, most 
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of the residents of these suburbs perceive and describe themselves 
as being ‘middle class’ – and the emergence of a milieu which may 
be described by that term is sometimes viewed as a move towards 
modernity. These suburbs and the lifestyles therein certainly fit with one 
of the many meanings that attach themselves to the term modern – of a 
contemporaneous lifestyle, as different from established past practices. 
Another way in which the word has been interpreted is as a move 
away from relatively feudal, agrarian ways of living, towards industrial 
and post-industrial modes of production, occupation and consumption – 
Giddens describes modernity as “roughly equivalent to ‘the industrialized 
world’” (Giddens 1991: 15). Although the trend in Kashmir, particularly 
among those moving from rural areas to these suburbs, is away from 
agriculture, it is not necessarily towards industry. Indeed, many of 
those who participated in traditional production – weaving, embroidery 
and handicrafts – tend to give these up as they move to these suburbs. 
A large majority of those who inhabit these suburbs work in, or aspire 
to work in, the government or in professions. One might add that, in 
the context of Kashmir, there is often an overlap between government 
employment and professions. For, most doctors, engineers and teachers 
aspire to be employed by the government. It is worth noting in this 
context that the proportion of the population of the Jammu and Kashmir 
state in India that is employed in government is about five percent. The 
comparative figure for Gujarat is 0.9 percent.
To turn to another development that is often taken to be an indicator 
of modernity, the trend in these suburbs is towards living in relatively 
unitary families. Some of the families that move to these areas leave 
an older generation – as well as other members of their erstwhile 
joint families – in their earlier dwellings, either in the countryside or 
in the inner city. However, the new social milieu in these suburbs do 
not seem to conform to another measure of modernity: it would be 
worth examining whether gender and inter-generational relations in 
the unitary families living behind those high suburban walls are more 
egalitarian than they used to be. Indeed, a Kashmiri woman who moves 
from an agrarian setting to these suburbs might lose the relatively 
influential position she had in her village home. Many Kashmiri women 
have traditionally managed their farms, not only the cattle but also the 
paddy fields. They often ruled their households from their kitchens even 
while they deferred formally to their husbands and other older males as 
titular heads of their households.
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1.3. Trans-local Communities
There is another dimension of suburban life patterns which makes 
those walls virtually irrelevant. This is the fast spread of telephony 
and internet services. Kashmir has a very high density of SIM cards 
and phone usage, including GPRS.17 Particularly young residents of 
these suburbs spend substantial time on the internet, particularly on 
social networking sites, and on the telephone. Phone company records 
indicate that night time usage is extremely high. This may have to do 
with the cheaper rates that some service packages offer – even free 
talk time for a few hours after midnight. So, another aspect of the very 
walls that would seem to exclude is that they also help to link – virtually. 
For, the privacy of separate rooms for young residents can allow them 
to make new lifestyle choices, such as talking to friends and lovers late 
at night without interference from parents and other authority figures. 
Another question arises then: could trans-local communities be forming 
from behind those walls, which might to an extent replace the local 
community of physical neighbours? Social networking sites provide easy 
access to any number of such trans-local communities. Internet access 
combines with credit cards to bring shopping and other consumption 
possibilities right into the home. In addition, phones and private cars 
give easy access to communities that may not be counted as relatives 
or neighbours in a traditional sense but might become as vital a source 
of support in the contemporary context. 
Some of these communities – online as well as physically accessible 
– are religious. Groups such as Jamaat-e-Islami18 and Ahle-Hadith have 
a large number of adherents in many of Kashmir’s suburbs – although 
their influence is by no means restricted to suburbs. The most obvious 
evidence of their influence is the number of Jamaat-e-Islami and Ahle-
Hadith mosques that have recently been built. Some first generation 
urban residents, particularly professionals, tend to join such religion-
based organisations. This adherence appears to provide a veneer of 
respectability to some. To others, it gives migrants to these suburbs 
access to a network of associates which could serve as a support system 
in their new environment.19 The relative numbers of new mosques and 
educational institutions affiliated to these religious groups would indicate 
that they have the greatest impact on the wealthier of the suburbs. 
At one level then, the physical walls surrounding suburban houses 
in such areas would seem to reflect the ideological walls that some 
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of these groups’ proponents promote among their adherents (Sikand 
2011). Yoginder Sikand has argued that: 
The spread of conservative and supremacist versions of Islam 
in recent years in Kashmir, as represented, for instance, by the 
Jamaat-e Islami, the Tablighi Jamaat and the Wahhabi Ahle-
Hadith, has only further exacerbated these exclusivist tendencies 
and perceptions. Many of those associated with or influenced 
by such movements regard Hindus (and other non-Muslims) as 
deviant and godless, and, in many cases, simply by definition 
as ‘enemies of Islam’ and as allegedly collectively engaged in a 
grand global conspiracy against the faith. Close social interaction 
with non-Muslims and following their ways is frowned upon, in 
many cases, sternly condemned, for this is seen as threatening 
to dilute the Muslims’ own commitment to Islam. Ideally, in this 
worldview, Islam and its followers must dominate over others. 
‘Islam has come to dominate the world,’ they insist.20
It is true that the beliefs and preachings of such groups are exclusivist, 
even tendentious – and that they have substantial influence in some of 
these suburbs. To the extent that these groups’ preachers often focus 
on global issues and project Muslims as a group under worldwide siege, 
they build walls on a global scale. If one accepts Sikand’s description, 
one might be tempted to view the physical walls of Kashmir’s suburbs 
as overt parallels, and metaphors, of the ideological walls which such 
religious movements seek to build. The seclusion they provide from 
traditional socialisation might promote involvement in such trans-
local, even global, movements, just as seclusion behind those walls 
and the privacy of individual rooms promotes involvement with groups 
accessible by phone and internet.
1.4. Nascent Alternative Communities
However, mosques and the educational institutions which they control 
are not the only sites for socialising in Kashmir’s suburbs. New kinds 
of local community are emerging, particularly in some of the less 
wealthy suburbs. Most obviously, suburban neighbourhoods cut across 
traditional community structures based on occupation. The inner city 
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of Srinagar was organised on the pattern of medieval Islamic guilds.21 
Therefore, some inner city areas contained a concentration of families 
from a common occupational group – groupings which may be viewed 
as castes. Many Kashmiris resist the idea that a caste system exists 
among Muslims but, as with many different religious groups across 
South Asia, caste has been noted as a facet of Kashmiri Muslim society 
(Ahmed 1978).22 In suburbs, families from very different (traditional) 
occupational backgrounds live next door to each other. There is little 
evidence of residential enclaves of persons with a common occupation. 
If there is occupational commonality, it relates to government em-
ployment, but this can take many forms. A police officer’s house may 
be flanked by that of a doctor on one side and of a teacher on the other.
In fact, instead of the medieval pattern of occupation-based enclaves, 
a hierarchy of status appears to have emerged between various suburbs 
around Srinagar. It would be inadequate to ascribe this hierarchy simply 
to wealth. Rather, factors such as education, social background and 
ease with metropolitan cultures combine with wealth to determine 
the hierarchical status of a particular suburb. Perceptions regarding 
the status of a suburb influence factors such as rents. However, the 
structures and infrastructure of the different suburbs are evolving in 
similar patterns, e.g. the seclusion of individual families behind high 
walls, narrow roads, and the absence of sewerage systems.
While caste/occupational divides appear to be easing fast in these 
suburbs, the blurring of other sorts of identity-based divides is slower. 
However, those processes too are evident: some of the emergent social 
networks in these suburbs tend to include persons and families from 
different religious, sectarian and ethnic identity groups. There is some 
evidence of relatively new ties being formed between neighbours who 
might be Shia and Sunni, Sikh and Muslim, may belong to different 
caste groups, and different linguistic-ethnic groups such as Pahari, 
Gujjar23 and Kashmiri. This appears to be more apparent in less wealthy 
suburbs than in wealthier ones. A noteworthy aspect of the processes 
by which these new inclusive social networks are being formed is that 
they are often led by women and young people. This is a counterpoint 
to mosques – and, to a large extent, educational institutions – which are 
dominated by men, often middle-aged or older men.
Schools are a major site for the formation of these new community 
(or, depending on one’s viewpoint, inter-community or inter-identity) 
networks. Students whose families might identify themselves by such 
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linguistic-ethnic labels as Pahari or Gujjar, such sectarian terms as 
Shia or Sunni, or religion-based categories such as Sikh or Muslim, 
form friendships which often last after they have finished school. My 
anthropological research in two of these suburbs shows that relationships 
formed between students often extend to relationships with the student’s 
family, as young people visit each other’s homes, eat there, and even 
sometimes sleep over. In fact, schools are not the only sites where 
students meet, interact and form new networks. This also takes place 
in playgrounds, gymnasiums, billiards and pool centres, internet cafes, 
neighbourhood snack shops and other such sites of socialising. 
My field research shows that women, particularly housewives, too, 
sometimes form close associations with relatively new neighbours. This 
is manifest not only in everyday coming and going but also in their 
participation in organising weddings in each other’s homes. Some of 
the women who thus help each other did not know each other until they 
became neighbours by shifting to that suburb a few years ago. In the past, 
it was common in both rural and urban areas for families, particularly 
women, of the neighbourhood to work hard together to organise and co-
host weddings. However, these women generally belonged to families 
which had been neighbours for generations. This pattern of mutual 
assistance has organically been carried over to some of these suburbs, 
only now it becomes a way to form networks of bonding, sometimes 
across identities that tended in the past to sometimes divide. 
In the past, in both the rural hinterland and the inner city, 
community24 consisted of local neighbours and a network of distant 
relatives. Members of the extended family could be dispersed far from 
one’s home but they would generally arrive at a home where a wedding 
was to take place several days earlier and would work together with the 
immediate family like co-hosts. They also tended to assemble for the 
Chahrum rituals on the fourth day following a death.25 In rural areas, 
one’s neighbours meant more or less the entire village, barring those 
families and networks with which one’s own family or network was 
engaged in a feud of some sort. However, even these would generally 
be invited to a wedding, and would visit when someone died.
My research shows that these concepts of community are changing 
among at least some suburban residents. Although a person or 
family’s network of support still includes at least part of the immediate 
neighbourhood and the dispersed extended family, circles of friends 
have become far more important as those upon whom one relies in 
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times of trouble, or of celebration. This is particularly evident among 
younger residents of some of Kashmir’s suburbs. 
The following part of this paper sheds more light on these trends.
2. Part Two: Community at a Wedding
In this second part of this paper, I rely on notes from my fieldwork in a 
Kashmiri suburb during September 2011. I spent a week living in the 
house of the bride during a Muslim wedding, where I conducted hitherto 
unpublished anthropological field research. This house too is surrounded 
by high walls, which seclude the family far more than when it lived in 
an inner-city area. The new networks of association and support which 
are being formed by members of this family became evident during the 
wedding celebrations, preparations and related rituals. The following 
vignettes present a microcosmic view of some of the emergent patterns 
of exclusion and inclusion which have been described in general terms 
in Part One. 
This part focuses on three strands of community formation, as they 
became evident during this particular suburban wedding. The first is 
the replacement to some extent of the extended family by a circle of 
friends as the ones who took primary responsibility as organisers and 
co-hosts at this wedding. A sub-theme of this first strand of community 
formation is the inclusion of different linguistic-ethnic groups – a 
Pahadi among Kashmiris in this particular case. The second strand of 
community formation concerns the participation of neighbours from 
different religion-based communities in each other’s social functions – 
in this particular case, the inclusion of Sikhs in the celebration of this 
Muslim wedding. The third strand is nuanced. It focuses primarily on 
inclusion and exclusion on the basis of gender. In this context, I focus 
on customs based on different interpretations of Islam. Also, based on 
my own experience as a non-Muslim, non-Kashmiri participant observer 
at this wedding, I refer to my access to those of the wedding functions 
in which mainly only women participated in the context of the outsider-
insider paradigm (Hage 2006: 1). 
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2.1. Communities as Networks of Support 
An aspect of community bonding that was clearly discernible at this 
wedding involved the circle of the bride’s brother’s friends. To an extent, 
it provided a counter-point to the loosening of bonds between members 
of the extended family, which was also evident at the wedding. Both 
these trends were evident in the extent to which the brother’s friends 
on the one hand and the extended family on the other appeared to 
take upon themselves the responsibility to organise the wedding rituals 
and celebrations, and to behave as co-hosts. It was in the almost 
unconsciously undertaken acts of shouldering, or not shouldering, 
responsibility that the strength of the emergent bonds of community 
was evinced. Throughout the week that I spent living in the house of the 
bride before and during the wedding, her brother’s friends functioned 
as the organisers and co-hosts of the wedding – much more so than the 
extended family. Some of these friends worked hard for several days, 
often staying overnight. It was this brother and his friends who carried 
the burden of the hard work involved in preparing the tent under which 
the feast was to be served, negotiating with the professional chefs 
who cooked the feast, buying the meat, cutting the salad, buying the 
wood on which the feast was cooked, arranging the lights and other 
decorations, and actually seating and serving the guests. These friends 
were not immediate neighbours but lived in nearby suburbs.
At least half-a-dozen of the friends slept there for the main three 
or four nights of the wedding, strategising till late about which of them 
would undertake what chores the next day. Those late night sessions 
were also processes of further bonding: the young men would joke, play 
cards, smoke, watch film clips together on a laptop, or play practical 
jokes on one another – e.g., spraying foam on one who had gone to 
sleep. When the time to work came, however, most of them showed 
a great sense of responsibility. On the mehendi-raat26, the eve of the 
wedding, four of the brother’s friends laid out rugs, mattresses and 
sheets for the night’s singing, while the bride’s cousins lounged around 
or went up the nearby hill for a walk, and older male relatives sat and 
smoked or watched the chefs preparing the feast in a neighbouring 
yard. It rained heavily on the day of the wedding. Yet, this brother and 
his friends, along with only one of his cousins, formed a chain to carry 
the platters on which the feast was served across the approximately 70 
metres from where it was cooked to the halls in which it was served.
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Over the previous few weeks, these friends had spent a lot of time 
and energy driving their families’ cars to distant places to deliver 
invitations. For, one of the legacies of the days in which community was 
far less dispersed is that an invitation to a Kashmiri wedding must be 
delivered in person by a relative of the bride or groom. To send a card 
by post or courier would be seen as a snub; the recipient of a posted 
invitation would almost certainly not attend, and would most likely hold 
a grudge for years.
One of the brother’s friends had left his work in Jaipur a thousand 
kilometres away to come and work at this wedding. The grandfather of 
three of the other friends (brother or first-cousin to each other) died 
on the night before the mehendi-raat. Yet, one of them was there the 
next evening to take charge of serving tea to those from the groom’s 
family who had brought the mehendi (henna) for the bride. He later 
told me that this was his duty. He pointed out that within moments of 
their telephoning the bride’s brother that their grandfather had died, 
the brother had appeared at the hospital, leaving his sister’s wedding 
celebrations. The brother had also gone for the funeral the next 
morning. This friend of the bride’s brother spoke of being able to trust 
one’s friends more than relatives. During my interview with him, which 
focused on the importance of friends and relatives respectively, he said 
“I hate relatives” – they are “ungrateful.”
Another of the brother’s friends, who describes himself as Pahadi 
(a linguistic-ethnic term), spoke of being able to choose one’s friends 
and not one’s relatives. Friends have a connection of the heart, he said, 
“relatives are forced on you.”27 This Pahadi friend is married and has a 
child. Yet, he stayed at the bride’s house for three nights. The bride’s 
brother and a couple of his cousins seemed to treat him with great 
familiarity, like a brother. One of them explained that he had been a 
schoolboy when he first got to know this Pahadi friend through his 
cousin. So, he looked upon this Pahadi friend as a mentor and elder 
brother.
In the past, in both city and village, this pattern of bonding and 
taking responsibility at social functions was mainly the function of the 
extended family. The bride’s father told me that relatives used to come 
to the home where a wedding was to take place several days before the 
wedding, and that relatives used to work hard to arrange the wedding. 
On the day before the three main days of wedding rituals, he told me 
he was upset that his sisters and brothers and their children had not yet 
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come. He complained that they were behaving like guests – implying 
that they should be behaving as co-hosts.28 It is a fact that joint families 
were the norm 60 or 70 years ago, but the situation has gradually 
changed. Even two decades ago, he and his three younger brothers 
lived in the same house. The other three remained under the same roof 
until just six or seven years ago. Since this was the first wedding in 
the next generation, his expectations from his siblings appeared to be 
based on his experience when they were still a joint family. As it turned 
out, his second brother never came at all for this wedding; nor did one 
of the four sons of his third brother. This third brother now lives in a 
suburb of another city. 
2.2. Inter-Religious Engagement
It was obvious at this wedding that norms for engagement between 
neighbours who think of themselves as belonging to different 
communities are in the process of evolving. This is particularly true 
about relations between religion-based communities. A number of Sikh 
families live in this suburb, some of them in a row of houses right across 
the narrow street from the house of the bride. More than a dozen Sikh 
women, generally middle-aged, visited the bride’s house at around 11 
p.m. on the eve of the wedding. Their visit was evidently timed to take 
place after the groom’s relatives who had brought the henna had left, 
and before the singing and dancing that accompany the application of 
henna had begun. The Sikhs were served pastries, boiled eggs and 
savouries such as samosas. No meat was offered, since Sikhs do not 
generally eat halal meat.29 The mother of the bride told me later that 
she had taken a live chicken to the home of each of 13 neighbouring 
Sikh families earlier that day for them to slaughter and cook in their 
preferred way. The bride’s mother said this was not common – that she 
had gone out of her way to do this. The Sikh women told me that it was 
commonplace to present a live chicken to neighbours from Sikh and 
Muslim families respectively, instead of cooked food. 
These differing narratives make it evident that norms for engagement 
are nascent and still evolving. This became even more obvious when tea 
was brought to the room where the Sikhs were seated. Some of the 
Sikhs accepted it. Then, while the bride’s sister was still taking round 
the tea tray, one of the visitors said, “we don’t drink tea.”30 After she 
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said that, some of the others refused the tea. Two of them said they had 
a stomach ache. One or two of those who had already accepted the tea 
continued to drink it.31
To my questions, the Sikhs readily replied that everyone lived together 
amicably and participated in each other’s weddings, funerals and other 
social events. However, their descriptions of how this took place used 
the pronouns ‘we’ and ‘they’ liberally – for example, “four of them eat 
together off one trami” 32 or “our weddings take place during the day” or 
“there is no singing and dancing at our mehandi ceremonies.”
2.3. Gender Inclusion and Exclusion
My participant observation at this suburban wedding was crucial to my 
discovering that circles of friends have become more important than in 
the past, sometimes replacing the extended family in the organising of 
such key social rituals as those surrounding a wedding. For, I occasionally 
joined the bride’s brother’s friends while they bonded at night. My role 
as a participant observer was even more crucial to discover the level 
of openness to an ‘outsider’ such as me. My experience was mixed. 
Within the family of the bride, my hosts, I was welcomed with a level 
of openness that I had not expected. For example, I was initially 
hesitant to enter the room where Sikh women were being entertained. 
However, when she noticed my curiosity, the bride’s mother led me in 
and introduced me. The Sikhs too did not seem to mind at all. Everyone 
seemed to want to help my research into community life in the suburbs. 
Their attitudes indicated that there was nothing negative to observe. 
I also had not thought I would be allowed to observe the first function 
of the wedding festivities on the previous evening. This was a function 
for women and it took place on the top floor of a three-storey house. I 
was not only male, I was an outsider. The men of the family sat in rooms 
on the lower floors, chatting and smoking. However, when I asked 
questions about what was happening upstairs, I was urged to go up and 
see. I stopped in the corridor on top of the stairs, thinking I would watch 
from the door. But when the bride’s mother saw me, she enthusiastically 
welcomed me in. That day, ghee33 had been applied to the bride’s hair 
and body and now perhaps 30 or 40 women (mainly the extended family, 
friends and a few neighbours), dressed in fine salwar-kameez, lehenga 
or phiran34 suits, were singing traditional Kashmiri wedding songs. A 
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couple of them played the rhythm on earthen Tumbaknaris.35 Being 
unsure about the norms of purdah36 this household would observe, I 
was relieved to find even the bride’s grandmother and other women of 
that generation beaming at me when I was seated in the room.
I found that, when the groom and his party arrived for the actual 
nikaah, wedding ceremony, the level of inclusion was reduced. 
Segregation of men and women too was much greater. The bridegroom 
and his baraat (i.e., the groom’s party) were seated and then feasted in 
the same large top-floor room where I had been welcomed to join the 
women of the bride’s family. I had been encouraged by the welcoming 
responses to my presence at the festivities over the past two days. So, 
when a little girl who was perhaps twelve years old told me she wanted 
to see the groom, I took her up those stairs to peep into that room. 
Suddenly, I found I had gone too far. The girl was urgently and angrily 
shooed away from the door by the bride’s brother and cousins. They 
seemed quite upset. They later explained to me that the bridegroom 
had brought his family’s favourite maulvi37 to conduct the nikaah and 
this maulvi had set a strict condition, that no woman should be visible.
Apparently, the groom’s family (or at least their maulvi) was less 
gender-inclusive than the bride’s family. Two facts may possibly be 
relevant in this context. One, the groom’s family does not live in a 
suburb; they hail from a village. Two, the groom has worked in Saudi 
Arabia for several years. He had come from there for just a few weeks 
for the wedding. Neither of these facts is a definitive reason, however. 
I have experienced great inclusivity in other Kashmiri villages, and was 
invited for a lavish tea at the groom’s house a few days later. I would 
like to point out here, again without positing it as definitive proof of 
a relationship between gender tolerance and what might broadly be 
described as Sufi faith, that the bride’s family turned to pirs (ritual 
healers often connected with Sufi traditions) as well as to doctors when 
she fell ill soon after the wedding. Prayers and blessings and amulets 
were sought. 
Conclusions 
Emergent networks of community in Kashmir’s new suburbs sometimes 
include members of identity groups based on different religions, sects 
and language or ethnicity. Such inclusive networks appear to be more 
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common in suburbs than in either the inner cities or rural areas, from 
both of which locales residents of these suburbs have migrated. Families 
belonging to a particular occupational group are even less likely to 
live in proximity with each other than those belonging to a particular 
religion, sect or linguistic-ethnic community. Even where families of a 
particular identity group live in proximity in a suburb, they tend to be 
less exclusively concentrated than in the inner city. 
Not only are the new networks of community in these suburbs 
nascent, norms for engagement between and among them are 
evolving, sometimes awkwardly. However, even as these norms are 
being re-imagined, it is apparent that circles of friends with whom 
suburban residents choose to associate are, in at least some cases, 
replacing the extended family as the primary bulwark of support. At 
times, these circles of friends include persons from different religious, 
sectarian or linguistic-ethnic backgrounds. Schools and other locales of 
youth socialising are key sites for the formation of these new, inclusive 
networks. Housewives too sometimes take the lead in associating with 
relatively new neighbours.
The high walls between individual houses in Kashmir’s new suburbs 
tend to fragment extended families, even society at large. There are 
other signs of withdrawal from physical community, particularly in 
wealthier suburbs. However, despite those walls around individual 
houses, the unavoidable interactions that take place in these new 
suburban neighbourhoods tend to blur sociological divides between 
communities based on religion, sect, language and occupation. On the 
other hand, seclusion can in fact promote alternative modes of inclusion, 
despite physical exclusion. For, the privacy that those walls allow gives 
residents, particularly younger ones, opportunities to participate in 
virtual networks and markets, and to connect over the telephone. 
Participation in trans-local networks, some of them religious, some of 
them even global, is also growing. 
Endnotes
1 A counterpart of this usage is the common pejorative use of 
terms such as ‘grahistu’ (which originally refers to a farmer; 
equivalent terms in English would include ‘bumpkin’ and 
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‘yokel’) for people from beyond Srinagar, even if they hail 
from a city such as Baramulla.
2 Between the British East India Company and the Sikh Empire.
3 Between the British East India Company and Maharaja Gulab 
Singh of Jammu.
4 According to Rajtarangini, the 11th century chronicle composed 
by Kashmiri poet Kalhana, the city was established by the 
Emperor Ashoka (3rd century BCE).
5 Afghan rule (1756-1819), Sikh rule (1819-1846) and Dogra rule 
(1846-1952).
6 The Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, the first of the major reforms, 
limited ownership to 186 kanals (about 22 acres). The rest was 
distributed to tillers without compensation to the landlord. In 
an interview by the author, noted Kashmiri economist, journalist 
and former chairman of the J&K Bank, Haseeb Drabu, described 
Kashmir’s land reforms as the most radical anywhere in the world 
outside the Communist bloc. Personal Interview, 27.08.2005, 
Srinagar.
7 The Ceasefire Line, agreed between India and Pakistan on 1 
January 1949, was converted with some minor changes into the 
Line of Control through the Simla Agreement in 1972.
8 For example, Wazir Bagh and Karan Nagar.
9 Among them, one may list Rawalpora, Hyderpora, Bemina, 
Buchpora and Zakura in the vicinity of Srinagar, KP Road on 
the outskirts of Anantnag, and Sangri and Khoja Bagh around 
Baramulla.
10 Bemina is an example of a new suburb that was largely marshland. 
It gets flooded when there are heavy showers even today.
11 The Mughals, having conquered Kashmir during the reign of the 
Emperor Akbar, built a wall around a part of the city, but this 
was probably meant to protect only the enclaves of the rulers. It 
extends around a hill to the northeast of the city and there are 
remnants of a Mughal wall near the Foreshore Road northwest of 
the Dal Lake.
12 The city expanded across the river during times of prosperity 
such as the reign of Zainulabedin (1420-70) but shrank largely 
to the north and east of the river in periods such as the 19th 
century.
13 In recent years, high walls and gates are being constructed 
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in rural areas too but, as with most architectural fashions for 
dwellings, this may be viewed as attempts to copy urban culture. 
14 The reference here is to crimes such as murder, which are 
unrelated to militancy/insurgency/freedom struggle (at least on 
the face of it). Cf. Hashmi, Syed Junaid. 2007. Crime Rate 13 Times 
More than Militancy in Jammu and Kashmir. Countercurrents.






15 See, for example, voter turnout figures on the website of the 
Chief Electoral Officer Jammu and Kashmir for the assembly 
elections of 2008, (constituencies 18-25 are in Srinagar city). 
http://ceojk.nic.in/AC_Voter_Turnout_AE_2008.htm [retrieved 
19.08.2013].
16 Srinagar scored less than 20 on a scale of 100. http://twocircles.
net/2010may11/picturesque_srinagar_among_indias_four_
dirtiest_cities.html [retrieved 19.08.2013]
17 In private conversations with the author, officials of phone service 
providers claimed that SIM density and usage is the highest in 
South Asia. However, they could not make corporate records 
available.
18 The Jamaat-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir has a separate 
constitution, membership, shoura (council) and amir (head) from 
the Jamaat-e-Islami Azad Kashmir, the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind and 
the Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan.
19 Regarding urban businessmen and rich peasants, particularly 
orchard owners in Kashmir (orchards had been exempt from land 
ceiling) during the spurt of wealth in the 1970s, Praveen Swami 
notes that “Backing the high traditions of Islam as articulated 
by Jamaat-e-Islami and Ahle-Hadith, was a means of both 
gaining respectability and possessing a cultural ethos distinct 
and superior from the syncretic, freewheeling practices of the 
peasantry” (2007: 160).
20 Sikand, Yoginder. 2010. Competing Nationalisms and Religions 





21 Even today, localities are known for particular occupations, e.g. 
Zainakadal for goldsmiths, whose caste title often is Zargar, and 
Wazapora for wedding chefs. Cf. Irwin, John. 1955. Shawls: A 
Study in Indo-European Influences. London.
22 Walter Lawrence ([1895] 2000) uses the term ‘tribe’ and the 
Kashmiri word ‘kram’ in his chapter on “Races and Tribes.”
23 Lawrence (ibid.: 215) notes that Gujjars lived in the mountains 
around the Valley.
24 I use the term ‘community’ here in the sense of a network of 
association and support, rather than as an exclusive grouping 
based on religious, sect, ethnicity, caste or other identity.
25 Relatives, neighbours and associates of the deceased gather for 
prayers at the grave on the fourth day after a death. Traditionally, 
the family of the deceased often prepared a feast, put up tents 
and made arrangements to serve tea in samovars (large, ornate 
jugs with chimneys at the centre, these are often of carved 
copper) along with bakery products.
26 Traditionally, relatives of a Kashmiri groom bring henna to the 
bride’s home on the evening before the wedding. This is applied 
upon her hands, arms and feet in artistic patterns during 
the night, while the gathered relatives and neighbours are 
entertained with music. In many homes, women from among 
the relatives sing traditional wedding songs, accompanied by 
the tumbaknari rhythm instrument. Many families, more often 
in suburbs than elsewhere, hire a professional singer, who is 
generally accompanied by several musicians and a transvestite 
dancer.
27 Notes from author’s field research.
28 Notes from author’s field research.
29 Halal meat is from animals slaughtered in accordance with ritual 
Islamic prescription. The Sikh religion prescribes slaughter 
according to the jhatka method.
30 Notes from author’s field research.
31 Some Kashmiris of different religions limit co-dining only to raw or 
uncooked food. However, there are others who eat together, even 
off the same plate. I have attended Kashmiri Muslim weddings 
where vegetarian food was prepared and served separately for 
Sikh guests and others who wished to eat separately.
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32 The platter on which the Kashmiri feast is traditionally served. 
Some Kashmiris use it for meals at home too.
33 A dairy product, often described as clarified butter.
34 Traditional women’s suits, often embroidered.
35 An earthen Kashmiri folk instrument which is used during 
weddings.
36 Literally meaning a veil, the word refers to the segregation of 
women from men.
37 Preacher and religious scholar who often officiates at such rituals 
as marriage.
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